ASEAN and China say they are in the final phase of negotiating a South China Sea Code of Conduct aimed at managing maritime incidents and reducing conflict risk. The forecast assesses how likely a substantive, enforceable code is, how it could shape US-China competition, and what miscalculation risks remain over the next decades.
Verdict: Public statements from Philippine and Malaysian officials describe ASEAN-China talks on the code of conduct as being in their final phase with a goal of conclusion in 2026 (Japan Times, 2026-01-18; The Star, 2026-01-20). Chinese and Philippine rhetoric remains sharp, indicating that even with a code, operational frictions will persist (Inquirer, 2026-01-22; Philstar, 2026-01-22). Taken together, the evidence supports a baseline in which a politically significant but operationally limited code emerges within a year, moderating but not removing conflict risks.
ASEAN and China conclude a legally robust, operationally detailed code of conduct that clarifies geographic scope and incident-management protocols. Naval and coast guard forces receive joint training and hotlines reduce the risk of miscalculation. Third-party navies adjust operations but continue presence within a predictable, rules-based framework, leading to gradually lower incident rates and more economic cooperation.
A code of conduct is signed but remains politically focused and only partially binding, with ambiguous language on enforcement and scope. Claimant-state and Chinese vessels still engage in risky maneuvers, but new communication channels prevent crises from spiraling out of control. External powers continue freedom-of-navigation operations, and tensions remain episodic rather than catastrophic.
Talks stall or produce an extremely weak document, while militarization and paramilitary activity accelerate. A serious collision or water-cannon incident injures personnel, prompting domestic backlash and retaliatory moves. The United States and allies increase patrols and joint exercises, while China hardens positions, raising the risk of an extended standoff or limited clash.
A sudden political shift in one key ASEAN state or China, or an unrelated financial shock, reshuffles priorities and derails negotiations. Competing mini-lateral security arrangements emerge that bypass ASEAN, fragmenting regional positions. Alternatively, a breakthrough confidence-building measure such as joint resource development rapidly improves trust, allowing a deeper code than currently envisioned.
Developments: ASEAN and China continue technical work on the code text, with officials reiterating that negotiations are in a final phase and targeted for conclusion in 2026.([japantimes.co.jp](https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2026/01/18/asia-pacific/politics/philippines-foreign-secretary-coc-south-china-sea/?utm_source=openai)) Prior commitments to complete the code by 2026 keep political pressure high even as difficult issues like geographic scope remain.([rfa.org](https://www.rfa.org/english/southchinasea/2025/04/25/south-china-sea-code-of-conduct/?utm_source=openai)) Incidents involving water cannons, lasers or ramming may still occur, but parties experiment with new hotlines, notification procedures and joint statements to de-escalate. US and allied navies maintain a visible presence and adjust communications protocols to reference any agreed language without conceding legal positions.
Risks: A serious collision or casualty during this period could harden domestic opinion before the code is fully embedded in standard operating procedures. Nationalist narratives may portray compromise as weakness, limiting leaders' flexibility to implement risk-reduction measures. Misunderstandings about how the code applies to third-state navies could create new friction points rather than resolving old ones.
Outlook: The most likely outcome is a signed or near-final code with limited but real crisis-management value. Regional and external actors treat it as one tool among many rather than a comprehensive solution. Conflict risk remains material but slightly reduced compared with a no-code world.
Developments: If adopted, the code begins to feature in diplomatic talking points, incident notes and coast guard guidance. Claimant states cite its provisions selectively when protesting encroachments or dangerous maneuvers, while China emphasizes clauses that reinforce its preferred framing of disputes. Joint working groups meet intermittently to review implementation, though many recommendations remain nonbinding or under-resourced.
Risks: Implementation may be uneven, with some agencies or local commanders ignoring new procedures in favor of established tactics. Parties could exploit ambiguities to claim compliance while continuing activities that others view as provocative, eroding trust in the document. A perception that the code changes little on the water could fuel cynicism about diplomatic solutions and strengthen hardline voices.
Outlook: The most plausible picture is of a modest stabilizing effect concentrated in communication and crisis management. Material capabilities and outpost construction continue to shape facts in the water more than the new rules. The code's legitimacy depends on whether it is seen as constraining behavior rather than simply repackaging existing positions.
Developments: By year three, the code's terminology is embedded in regional communiqués, legal briefs and naval training documents. Some recurring friction points see fewer clashes, as vessels follow mutually understood signaling and notification patterns. New areas of contestation may emerge as technology such as uncrewed systems, maritime domain awareness networks and dual-use infrastructure complicate interpretation of agreed rules.
Risks: If violations appear cost-free, parties could normalize selective noncompliance, weakening broader respect for regional norms. Parallel hard-security dynamics, including missile deployments and expanded bases, might overshadow incremental gains from the code. A crisis elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific could spill over, with actors invoking the code to justify actions it was never designed to cover.
Outlook: The baseline is a mixed record: some concrete safety gains but no resolution of core sovereignty disputes. The code serves as a reference point that can either anchor future improvements or ossify a tense status quo. Its long-run value hinges on whether states invest in verification, transparency and joint incident reviews.
Developments: Within five years, ASEAN reviews the code's operation and considers updates or annexes addressing gray-zone tactics and new technologies. Claimant states that benefit from predictable fishing and energy exploration corridors advocate incremental strengthening of provisions. China uses the code to argue that regional issues should be handled without external interference, while some ASEAN members quietly deepen security ties with outside powers to hedge.
Risks: If review processes stall or are captured by narrow interests, the code could ossify even as realities at sea evolve. A perception that the framework implicitly ratifies stronger states' positions may alienate smaller claimants and encourage unilateral moves. Escalation risks could return if political leaders stop investing attention and resources in maintaining communication mechanisms.
Outlook: Most indicators point toward a modestly effective but politically contested framework. The code helps manage day-to-day interactions but does not eliminate coercive behavior or arms competition. Without sustained diplomatic energy, its relevance to emerging challenges could slowly decline.
Developments: Over a decade, the code may evolve into a component of a broader Indo-Pacific maritime architecture that includes fisheries, search-and-rescue and environmental cooperation. Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues draw on early experience to propose more detailed incident-at-sea agreements. Younger officers and diplomats, trained under the code, view some behaviors once seen as assertive as unacceptable, reinforcing gradual norm shifts.
Risks: Domestic political swings in key states could upend commitments, leading to suspension or reinterpretation of provisions. Technological change, including autonomous swarms and underwater surveillance, could create entirely new categories of incidents not foreseen in the original document. A major-power confrontation elsewhere might prompt actors to weaponize maritime disputes, overwhelming the code's stabilizing influence.
Outlook: The likeliest pattern is gradual normalization of the code as one element of a thickening web of regional arrangements. Conflict remains possible but is increasingly constrained by expectations about acceptable behavior. However, the framework's ability to handle shocks will be tested repeatedly by technology, politics and external crises.
Developments: Two decades on, the South China Sea code, if broadly successful, could inspire similar instruments in other contested waters, including parts of the East China Sea or Arctic passages. Regional institutions may incorporate the code's language into binding agreements on environmental protection and resource sharing. Maritime domain awareness becomes highly integrated, making clandestine violations harder and increasing reputational costs for rule-breaking.
Risks: If the code fails or collapses, it could be cited as evidence that negotiated behavioral rules cannot manage great-power maritime competition. New military technologies may compress decision times so dramatically that even well-designed procedures are bypassed during crises. Climate-driven changes in fish stocks and sea levels might intensify resource competition beyond what any existing framework envisaged.
Outlook: The central expectation is that the code's legacy will be mixed but non-trivial, shaping how regional actors think about rules even if they do not fully comply. Its influence on other theaters will depend on whether it is associated with relative stability or with unresolved grievances. Long-run deterrence and alliance structures will remain more decisive than any single document.
Developments: Across half a century, the South China Sea code could either be remembered as a foundational step toward codified great-power coexistence or as a footnote in an era of expanding rivalry. If regional integration deepens, its core principles might be absorbed into a comprehensive Indo-Pacific maritime convention. Historical scholarship will examine how early risk-reduction mechanisms contributed to or failed to prevent any major conflicts in the region.
Risks: Structural shifts in power, including potential relative decline or realignment of major actors, may render the original assumptions behind the code obsolete. Novel domains such as space-based sensing and undersea data cables could create new vulnerabilities only loosely connected to earlier rules. In a worst case, a large-scale conflict might retrospectively frame the code as an inadequate response to rising dangers.
Outlook: Given deep uncertainty, the most defensible view is that the code will modestly influence norms but not determine the strategic balance. Its existence may reduce some pathways to war while leaving others untouched. Ultimately, broader political choices will overshadow any single confidence-building instrument.